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The Beautiful Soul: Aesthetic Morality in the Eighteenth Century. By Robert E. Norton.
Ithaca, NY, and London: Cornell University Press. 1995. xi+314 pp.
£27.50.
This is a very useful book. In examining one of the key concepts of the eighteenth-
century European world of discourse, it is exemplary of the kind of interdisciplinary
and intercultural scholarship that is now needed. Informed by current cultural
issues, it investigates in considerable analytical detail matters of abiding importance
to us at the end of the millennium, without any narrow, historicist tendency to lose
sight of the ultimate context of ‘European culture for as long as our collective
memory can recall’ (Preface, p. ix).
In his own words, Robert E. Norton ‘tells a story’, one that is only partially
familiar, at least from his very broad perspective. The conception of the Beautiful
Soul (a product of the European Enlightenment as a whole, though most distinct
and compelling in German) is traced in three major phases of its development: the
(mainly British) philosophizing about ‘moral beauty’; the (mainly German) insist-
ence on a link between religion and morals; the Hellenic ideal of kalokagathia,
particularly in its latter-day German appropriation. Modern ethical debate is seen
as arising to defend Christianity against Hobbes’s egoistic argumentation, and
Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding of 1690 is seen as decisive in
undermining the ethical religionists in insisting on the necessity of a rational basis to
morality. Locke’s Essay was, indeed, momentous in proclaiming ethics to be the
single most essential concern of humanity, a claim that was to become central to the
Enlightenment, which considered (despite Locke’s own distaste for the notion) ‘the
beauty of virtue’ the solution to the problems Locke had raised. Shaftesbury’s vision
of the Good and the Beautiful as symbiotically interrelated, like his emphasis on the
logical necessity of separating religion and morality, was systematically presented
by Francis Hutcheson (who made much of ‘moral sense’, a term used only once by
Shaftesbury himself ) and, in this form, became immensely influential. Shaftesbury
and Hutcheson, for whom Virtue was ‘a lovely Form’, conceived of Beauty as an
abstract, non-physical, neo-Platonic mode, but, as time passed, and ‘moral beauty’
remained at the centre of debate until the end of the century, it began to acquire
more and more a sensuous aspect.
In Germany this process was quickened by the pervasiveness of the later Pietistic
idea, derived from traditional mysticism, of the rebirth-transformation of the soul
‘shining forth for others to see as well’. Despite Spener’s pragmatic ethics (his Pia
Desideria of 1675 never mentions ‘beauty of soul’) the influence of his own teachers
(Arndt and Lu¨tkermann) ensured that the concept became central to the attainment
of personal divinity. And at Halle, seat of both Pietism and the then-fashionable
Wolffian philosophy, a remarkable cross-fertilization seems to have taken place.
Leibniz’s contention that ‘Beauty awakens Love’ (like his self-conscious congruence
with Shaftesbury) tended to tinge Wolff ’s would-be wholly rationalistic ethics,
issuing clearly in such writers as Baumgarten and Moses Mendelssohn, for whom
‘moral beauty had became a kind of categorical imperative’ (p. 92). While Edmund
Burke stood out against the ‘confusion’ of Beauty and Virtue, the pre-critical Kant
accepted the identity of the two as humanity’s greatest goal, a commitment that
coloured even his post-critical writings.
The late eighteenth-century desire to be reborn as Greeks, especially in Germany,
likewise entailed becoming beautiful human beings. Wieland seems to have been
the first to introduce the term kalokagathia (in 1758) to cover this phenomenon,
drawing on Plotinus’s revival of the aesthetic overtones of the ‘moral beauty’
transferred from social to ethical nobility in the fifth century bc. By mid-century the
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abstraction was being replaced by the more concrete, and more personal, ‘Beautiful
Soul’, and two works, Wieland’s Agathon and Rousseau’s Nouvelle He´loı¨se, were crucial
in consolidating the various strands of the Beautiful Soul tradition, in which
Rousseau revealed some fatal flaws. Agathon was simply the personification of
kalokagathia, in seeking to unify emotion and reason (p. 157); Rousseau’s novel, by
contrast, is seen, following Starobinski, as illustrating how ‘the belle aˆme has become
a hypocrite’ (p. 172). A much cruder development is the extraordinary European
success of Lavater’s Physiognomic Fragments of 1775. For him, beautiful souls reside in
beautiful bodies, or, at least, have pretty faces (a faith shared by the then-influential
philosopher of art, J. G. Sulzer). Lichtenberg’s (and Mendelssohn’s) powerful
criticisms of Lavater’s claims did not, however, exclude the possibility of the
beautiful expression of inner harmony, only the simplistic correlation of inner virtue
with the configuration of bodily features.
By the 1780s the Beautiful Soul was taken for granted as a valid conception of
reality by laymen and learned alike, and had become the guiding ethical ideal of the
Enlightenment, promising the Good Life and Happiness. The vehemence with
which Kant attacked the idea in his 1785 Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals
reveals (p. 217) his inability to do without it, for all the much-vaunted rationality of
his ethics: the concept of moral beauty, despite being repressed, returns to haunt his
theory of morality in the guise of the ‘moral feeling’ of Achtung (respect). Indeed, in
the Critique of Judgement, we find Kant arguing, albeit reluctantly, that interest in the
beauty of Nature (as distinct from Art) is a genuine mark of moral distinction
(p. 221): the lover of Nature’s beauty is, quite simply, a Beautiful Soul for Kant.
Schiller, who, unlike Kant, enthusiastically embraced the age-old notion of a deep
connection between the ethical and the aesthetic (p. ix), was the first to theorise the
concept of the Beautiful Soul seriously. In Norton’s view, fatefully reliant on
assertion rather than argumentation, Schiller failed to prove the link, despite the
persuasiveness of his magnificent rhetoric. And Goethe, in an interpolated
biographical story from Wilhelm Meister (‘the Confessions of a Beautiful Soul’) made
quite clear ‘a latent negativity’ in the concept (p. 260) by portraying his Pietistic
recluse, a woman devoted to her invisible Friend, Jesus, as a self-indulgent and
sterile ascetic. A negative conclusion, then, at the end of the century, to the career
of a once-dominant and lively idea, a negativity exceeded only by Hegel’s
devastating critique of the Beautiful Soul in his Phenomenology of 1807: beauty of soul
is inherently suicidal, surrendering existence to maintain its self (p. 275).
The conceptualization of the Beautiful Soul in the cultural theory of Weimar
Classicism is more differentiated than Norton’s account suggests. He attacks
Schiller’s ‘hazy logic’ (p. 236) in the private letters to Ko¨rner and in the foxingly
dialectical essay, On Grace and Dignity (both of 1793). In respect of the former he
follows John Ellis in treating what was an incomplete draft as if it were a finished
thesis, and in respect of the latter (following Kate Hamburger’s forty-year old
contributions), he leaves entirely out of account Schiller’s stated strategy of
uncovering the inadequacy of the (traditional) concept of the ‘Beautiful Soul’, in
order to argue for the need to supplement it with the moral category of the sublime
(Nationalausgabe, 21, 294). Moreover, Norton pays hardly any attention to what he
concedes is Schiller’s ‘major philosophical work’, The Aesthetic Letters (p. 244), where
(particularly in Letters xxiii, xxiv, and xxv), besides telling us precisely (pace
Norton) what the sensible attributes of beauty are (Letter iv), the aesthetic is
strenuously argued for as the necessary though not sufficient condition of both the
birth and the continuance of ethical behaviour. In nuce, Schiller argues that grace is
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impossible to feign, and that hypocrisy is thus inimical to the truly Beautiful Soul, by
virtue of the fact that aesthetic behaviour is a ‘sincere seeming’ (aufrichtiger Schein
(Letter xxvi) ). Thus Norton’s book, because of this surprising lacuna (not to mention
his neglect of Schiller’s late dramas in which the conventional idea of the Beautiful
Soul is mercilessly pilloried), tantalizingly leaves undiscussed the true eighteenth-
century culmination of the tradition he traces with such skill. In general Norton’s
power of synthesis finally invites the question whether the purely inward Beautiful
Soul of the early Pietistic tradition did not also sustain a life distinct from, say, the
Hellenic conception of moral beauty; and whether, crucially, Goethe and Hegel are
not attacking this neo-platonic abstraction rather than the aesthetic conception (as
Nietzsche’s differentiated critique was to do, on Norton’s own account (pp. 283–84) ).
In a word, is the ‘Love’ advocated by Hegel as reconciling Particular and Universal
really different in kind from that urged by Schiller in his down-to-earth injunction to
the Poets (Tabulae Votivae, 42) to use their sensuous medium to effect unity in much
the same way ‘as lovers use their bodies’?
None the less, Norton’s book is to be commended for casting fresh and
invigorating light on the living relevance of eighteenth-century intellectual problems
to one of the central preoccupations of such modern thinkers as Wittgenstein,
Foucault, and Richard Rorty (pp. 1–4).
University of Glasgow R. H. Stephenson
